Scientific evidence on the effect of sugar consumption on obesity has propelled policy makers in several states across the U.S. to propose the imposition of a tax on soft drinks sales. In this paper, we look at the effect of two tax events: a 5.5% sales tax on soft drinks imposed by the state of Maine in 1991, and a 5% sales tax on soft drinks levied in Ohio in 2003. We investigate this question by using sales data collected by scanner devices in the two states where soda taxes where enacted as well as on neighboring states. We employ a difference-in-difference matching estimator (DIDM) that, in our setting, permits the comparison among treatment and control groups based on brand identity. Results suggest that neither sales tax had a statistically significant impact on the consumption of soft drinks. This finding is robust to several alternative specifications.
Introduction
The rate of obesity in the U.S. is increasing dramatically. According to data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the percentage of obese people in the U.S. has increased from 20% in 2000 to 27.5% in 2010. Americans consume about 25% to 30% more daily calories today than they did 30 years ago. 1 There is evidence that the large increase in calorie intake has been significantly fueled by soda consumption. For instance, in 2009, a statement by the American Heart Association indicated that soft drinks and sugar sweetened beverages were the number one contributor of added sugars in Americans' diets. Consistent with this observation, several studies have shown how the consumption of soft drinks has significantly contributed to the increase in obesity, leading to a higher incidence of various diseases such as diabetes, heart disease, stroke, hypertension and cancer. For instance, Libuda and Mathilde (2009) in a review article find that prior research has consistently reported evidence in support of a causal relationship between soft drink consumption and excess weight gain. Similarly, the metaanalysis conducted by Vartanian et al. (2007) points to a clear association between soft drink intake and both larger energy intake as well as increased body weight.
In addition to the scientific evidence on the effect of sugar consumption on obesity, it is important to note that soft drinks have a very limited nutritional value. These two facts have propelled policy makers in several states across the U.S. to propose the imposition of a tax on soft drink consumption. Policy interventions that modify the price of a good are justified by the degree to which market failures exist in a given industry (Marshall 2000; Cawley 2004; Finkelstein, Ruhm, and Kosa 2005; Kim and Kawachi 2006; Powell and Chaloupka, 2009 ). In the case of soft drinks, there are several negative externalities associated its consumption; these externalities manifest themselves most evidently through the increased health care costs of treating diseases caused by obesity. These costs can take several forms, including higher health insurance premiums for all individuals as well as higher health expenditures by the government. Additional social costs may include productivity losses (Cawley, 2004) . Further, some people may have time-inconsistent preferences that would require public interventions (Powell and Chaloupka, 2009 ). For instance, it has been shown that children often do not take into account the future consequences of their actions, and that people, in general, may not appropriately discount the future costs of their behaviors (Komlos, Smith, and Bogin 2004; Smith, Bogin, and Bishai 2005) .
Excise taxes and special sales taxes on soda are already in place in 33 states. The Carbonated Soft Drinks (CSD) industry has succeeded in avoiding a soda tax to be included in the recent national health reform. Soda taxes have recently been proposed in at least 12 other states, though none of these proposals have yet been approved. The most effective way in which this tax should be imposed is not clear. Different proposals have been discussed, and they differ substantially across states. For example, Mississippi is considering legislation that would tax the syrup used in soda production while the state of New York, in its proposed state budget, recommended a penny-per-ounce tax on sugary beverages. In Washington State, legislators approved a two-cent tax on every 12 ounces of soft drinks sold. The overarching political argument is based on the economic rationale that price increases caused by higher taxes will dampen soda (and consequently sugar) consumption.
However, while research has investigated the potential consumption reaction to a tax increase, our assessment is that there is still uncertainty as to what the ultimate impact on consumption will be. Specifically, as we argue below, prior studies have exclusively relied on price elascticity estimates to form a counterfactual scenario of how consumption would react in the event of a tax increase. The main drawback of this approach is that relies on several assumptions. The first set of assumptions is related to modeling: accuracy of demand functional form as well as appropriateness of the treatment of price endogeneity. The second set of assumptions is related as to how the imposition of a tax will actually translate into final prices and whether consumers will treat a tax increase the same as a regular price increase. Instead, our approach is assumption-free as we look at the ex-post effect of the actual event of interest.
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In this paper, we shed light on this issue by looking at the effect of two soft drinks sales taxes. The first event corresponds to a 5.5% tax imposed by the state of Maine in July 1991. The second, more recent, event was the 5% sales tax increase imposed in Ohio in January 2003. The tax in Maine, called a "snack tax", was in effect from 1991 until 2001 (when it was reduced by 0.5%) and was applied to snack foods, soft drinks, carbonated water, ice cream and pastries. The tax in Ohio was applied exclusively to soft drinks; however, the definition of soft drinks in Ohio is broad as it includes not only "traditional soda pop beverages" but also "any sweetened nonalcoholic beverage, whether sweetened naturally or artificially, (unless it either contains milk products or a milk substitute or it contains greater than fifty percent (50%) fruit or vegetable juice by volume)".
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The primary focus of this paper is to examine the effect of both taxes on brand-level soda volume sales. As an additional exercise we also investigate whether tax-exclusive prices experienced a significant change; this analysis is important as theory does not provide unambiguous predictions as to how taxes are passed through to consumers. We investigate these questions using sales data collected by supermarket scanner devices. For the first event, we use 1988-1992 data from Maine (the treatment state) as well as from the neighboring states of Massachusetts, New York and Connecticut (the control states). For the second event, we utilize 2001-2006 data from Ohio (the treatment state), as well as from Michigan, Illinois and Pennsylvania (the control states). Studying two similar events separated by a 12-year period allows us to investigate whether consumers' response toward soda taxes has changed over time; this is an important question to analyze as it is commonly believed that consumers' perception of 2 See Angrist and Pischke (2010) for a lengthier discussion of the advantages of a reduced-form approach. 3 Ohio Department of taxation, http://tax.ohio.gov/ the negative effects of obesity has heightened in more recent years. The use of a brand-level data has two main advantages. First, we are able to employ a difference-in-difference matching estimator (DIDM) that provides a more powerful identification strategy than a difference-indifference estimator (Todd, 2007) . In a nutshell, this advantage comes from the fact that we can use a transparent matching procedure that relies on brand identity; we explain this in more detail in section 3. A second advantage of a brand-level analysis is that it allows us to study whether the tax imposition causes consumption (and/or pricing behavior) to vary across brands. This is important since a tax increases the final price of different brands by different dollar amounts. In sum, by accounting for differences in time-invariant unobservable factors between treated and control cities, we are able to isolate the sole impact of the tax policy on the volume and prices of soft drinks, at the brand level.
Our main finding is that the tax increase did not alter consumption in either state. Conversely, by and large, we find that brand-level tax-exclusive prices did not react to the tax increases, suggesting that the pass-through rate was 100%. While our results are specific to a 5.5% tax increase in Maine, and 5% in Ohio, we believe they are informative since the current mean sales tax rate (across all states) on soft drinks is 5.2%. Despite the fact that consumers' awareness of the negative effects caused by soft drink consumption might have increased over the 12 years that separate the two tax events (and to the extent that consumer behavior in Maine and Ohio is comparable to that of consumers in other states), our results suggest that the current level of soda sales taxes in the US appears to be too small to actually affect consumption in a sizeable way. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of related research. Section 3 contains a description of the methodology employed while section 4 describes the data. Section 5 contains the main results and section 6 concludes.
Literature Review
Regardless of the type of tax being analyzed (excise or ad valorem), inference in empirical work has been based on two elements an estimate of the own-price elasticity for soft drinks. The demand elasticity estimates considerably vary in the literature since they depend on the methodology used, the type of data available, and whether substitutes (e.g. other beverages) are considered. Studies typically report that demand for soft drinks (as a product category) is largely price-inelastic. A recent review on demand estimates for food products reports an ownprice elasticity for soda and other beverages that ranges between -0.8 and -1 (Andreyeva et al., 2010) . Lin et al. (2010) estimated two beverage demand systems using retail purchase data for high-income and low-income households. The authors found that, among high-income households, the demand for CSD is price elastic (mean of -1.29) while among low-income households demand is price inelastic (mean of -0.95). A large variance of price elasticity estimates is illustrated by the results in Zheng and Kaiser (2008) and Dharmasena and Capps (2011) who place the price elasticity estimate for soft drinks at -0.15 and -1.90, respectively. Studies exclusively looking at the effect of an excise tax (i.e. a fixed fee per ounce) find that such a tax would reduce consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages by a range that spans from 10% to 25% (Andreyeva et al., 2011; Institute of Medicine, Washington (DC), 2009; Hahn, 2009; Smith et al., 2010) .
Recent estimates by Yale University's Rudd Center for Food Policy and Obesity suggest that for every 10% increase in price, consumption decreases by 7.8% (Brownell and Frieden, 2009) ; the authors compute their estimate based on two specific tax proposals: a 10% sales tax, and a penny-per-ounce tax. Results in Wang (2010) greatly scale down the ones by Brownell and Frieden (2009) . As in Brownell and Frieden, Wang analyzes the impact of a 10% sales tax and a penny-per-ounce tax (assuming a 100% pass-through rate). The methodology consists in specifying a structural dynamic demand model that accounts for storability and heterogeneous tastes for soft drinks; storability turns out to be a crucial element for obtaining accurate predictions for the two possible tax policies. The author argues that this model provides more accurate estimates of consumers' price sensitivity and thus allows for a more reliable prediction of the policy impact. Wang's estimate of the overall price elasticity for soft drinks (-0.33 ) is less than half of that obtained by Brownell and Frieden. Wang argues that not accounting for storability and intertemporal substitution can lead to an overestimate of the effect of the tax on consumption.
4
Given the wide range of elasticity estimates, it is not surprising to see why the effectiveness of a soft drinks tax on consumption is still being debated today. But there are other considerations in such calculations that make this exercise an even more uncertain endeavor. First, prior studies have assumed that the soda market would experience a 100% tax pass-through rate; that is, that the price observed by consumers would exactly shift by the same magnitude as the tax increase. If firms react to the tax change, for example by reducing their prices to counter the decrease in consumption, then this assumption would not be appropriate. In imperfectly competitive markets, it can also be the case that the tax is passed through to consumers by more than one hundred percent (Anderson et. al, 2001 ).
Second, even in the case that the 100% pass-through rate assumption is accurate, it is not clear that consumers will perceive a tax increase the same way they would perceive a price 4 The evidence by Wang is consistent the evidence reported in studies looking at the association between soda taxes and body weight. For instance, some cross-sectional studies have found minimal to no association among state-level soda taxes and body weight (Fletcher et al., 2010a and 2010b; Powell et al., 2009; Sturm et al., 2010) . Fletcher et al. (2010b) provide the first empirical examination of the effectiveness of soft drinks taxation in reducing adult obesity. The authors analyze the ultimate impact of changes in states' taxation rates in the period from 1990 to 2006 on changes in body mass index (BMI) and obesity, by exploiting the fact that approximately half of all states changed their soft drink tax rate in this period. Using an analysis that employed individual-level survey data, the authors find that soft drinks taxes do influence behavior but not enough to lead to significant changes in population weight. increase imposed by the manufacturer.
5 Since a price increase caused by a tax is only reflected at the cash register, and to the extent that consumers are primarily guided by the shelf price when making a purchase decision, a price increase through a sales tax is likely (as we find below) to dampen the reaction in consumption. Finally, elasticity-based studies can be sensitive to demand functional form and rely on the accuracy and appropriateness with which price endogeneity is dealt with.
Our study, while limited in its own right, does not suffer from the drawbacks of the earlier literature just mentioned. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first ex-post study that evaluates the impact on prices as a consequence of soda taxes. Further, we directly test whether the tax is fully passed onto the consumer, and we can highlight other likely pricing strategies that ensue from the tax.
Method
In this paper, we first investigate the consumption effect of a 5.5% sales tax on soft drinks imposed by the state of Maine on July 16, 1991. We employ sales data collected by scanner devices in Portland (Maine -our control city) as well as in Boston (Massachusetts), Albany (New York) and Hartford (Connecticut). Subsequently, we consider a more recent similar tax event, a 5% sales tax on soft drinks levied in Ohio on January 1, 2003. For this latter experiment we employ scanner data collected in Cleveland (Ohio -our control city) as well as in Detroit (Michigan), Chicago (Illinois) and Philadelphia (Pennsylvania). The available data therefore limit our comparison to consumption across cities (rather than across entire states). The data, provided by Information Resources Inc. (IRI), come from a sample of supermarkets in the largest metropolitan areas in the U.S. We use two datasets that include brand-level sales information for the periods 1988-1992 and 2001-2006 , respectively. More details on characteristics and differences of the two sets of data are provided in the next session.
To the extent that neighboring states serve as a reasonable control for both Maine and Ohio (respectively), data in such states allow us to isolate the effect of the tax from all other possible factors (e.g., trends, seasonality, nationwide changes in companies' policies, etc.). In addition, the brand-level analysis allows us to study whether the tax imposition causes consumption (or pricing behavior) to vary across brands. To measure the desired effect, we employ a difference-in-difference matching estimator (DIDM). The difference-in-difference matching (DIDM) estimator is superior to a simple DID estimator because comparison of treated and untreated units is based on their similarity. Conversely, a DIDM estimator is superior to a cross-sectional matching estimator since it accounts for differences in time-invariant unobservables between treated and untreated units (Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1997; Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd, 1998) . In our setting, the DIDM estimator permits the comparison among treatment and control groups based on brand identity; this means that the matching mechanism is simpler, more transparent, and more reliable as it does not rely on propensity scores.
Specifically, the DIDM estimator tailored for our panel data is given by:
where i and j denote observations in the treatment and control groups, respectively, while t and t' denote pre-and post-treatment time periods. I i is the set of units in the control group that are matched to treatment unit i and #I i is the number of elements in that set. The variable V denotes the outcome being measured (in our case volume sales or price) and the scalar N is the number of treated units (i.e. brands).
We tailor this estimator to the structure of our data. First, unlike usual matching estimators, we employ all treated units in the analysis rather than only those that would fall into a "common support" set. Second, instead of relying on propensity scores to match treated and untreated units, we define control units to be those brands in the control cities that match the identity of brand i in the treatment city (i.e. we manually choose the unit j that is matched to unit i). Finally, we study the outcome variable in logarithmic form (i.e. V corresponds to the logarithm of the variable of interest: volume sales or price); we adopt this transformation because the variance of volume sales (across brands) in our dataset is large (see Table 2 ).
We report results of the estimator both for several control cities (i.e. #I i >1) as well as for each control city separately (i.e. #I i =1). In the case of #I i >1, we consider two control cities (i.e. #I i =2) as well as all control cities (i.e. #I i =3) and weight all matches equally. Standard errors are calculated using the formula provided by Abadie and Imbens (2008) for nearest neighbor matching estimators.
As a robustness test, we also report results using the standard DID estimator:
where b, m and t denote brand, city and time (quarter), respectively; V denotes the outcome variable (volume sales or price); is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation is in the treatment city and 0 otherwise, and is a dummy variable equal to 1 in the post-tax period. Note that the logarithm of the outcome variable allows interpreting as the percentage change in the outcome variable due to the tax.
Description of the data

Tax events
In July of 1991, a sales tax of 5.5% on snacks and soda was instituted by the state of Maine. This information was initially obtained from Jacobson and Brownell (2000) and later confirmed (by phone) with staff in the Law and Legislative Reference Library, an office of the Maine Legislature. In our dataset, this date corresponds to the beginning of the third quarter in 1991.
For the second exercise, we selected a 5% sales tax on soft drinks sold in grocery stores and through vending machines, levied in Ohio effective January 1, 2003. In our dataset, this date corresponds to the beginning of the first quarter in 2003. 6 We selected this event over the others (in the 2001-2006 IRI dataset) because the availability of data for at least one city in the state where the tax was applied as well as availability of data for cities that may represent reasonable controls.
Data
We employ two sets of scanner data from IRI Infoscan, each for one of the two events we consider. Characteristics of the two databases are different, thus we will label the datasets as A and B, respectively. We next proceed with a brief description of the two.
Dataset A was collected from IRI's sample of supermarkets across the U.S. in the period 1988-1992. This sample comes from a universe of stores that account for 82% of all the grocery sales in the U.S.; from this universe, IRI samples supermarkets with annual sales of more than 2 million dollars. The dataset includes dozens of brands for up to 65 metropolitan areas spanning 20 quarters. The number of metropolitan areas is not the same over the sample period, but it grows over time. The database also contains information on the demographics for each metropolitan area, which is identified with the name of the main city in the area. A potential limitation of dataset A is the exclusion of convenience stores, bars, restaurants and other retail outlets for soft drinks. This lack of information may be of secondary concern as there is evidence suggesting that approximately 70% of soft drinks was sold through supermarkets around the time of our study (Higgins et al., 1995) .
Dataset B contains store sales data on carbonated beverage sales and prices during the 2001-2006 period. Data consists of weekly observations and includes 47 IRI metropolitan areas (for both datasets, we refer to a metropolitan area as a "city" henceforth).
7 Data are available at the store level for several chains. IRI only includes chains and not independent stores, and the observations are drawn from IRI's national sample of stores. For each store in each week, over 250 different Universal Product Codes (UPC) for carbonated beverage products are observed.
Thus, each brand (e.g. Coke) has multiple UPCs associated to it, each representing the particular presentation of the brand (i.e. such as packaging (6 pack v. single bottles) and presentation (e.g. can v. bottle); see Bronnenberg et al., 2008) .
As stated earlier, for each event we included 4 cities in the analyses. In both cases, the three control cities were chosen on the basis of geographical proximity to the city where the tax increase was observed. Also, the chosen cities showed no other event concerning sales taxes during the period of study. We focus our analyses on 6 quarters: 3 quarters immediately before the tax increase and the three quarters following the quarter when the tax increase became effective. 8 We exclude earlier and later quarters as the common trend assumption needed for the validity of a DID approach is less likely to hold. We exclude the third quarter of 1991 and the first quarter of 2003 (the quarters in which each of the two taxes took place) for reasons that will be explained later (section 5). We selected brands that are present in all quarters and in all cities in our study; this procedure allowed us to have a balanced panel (necessary for matching procedure). In Table 1a and 1b we report the selected brands in each event with their corresponding parent companies, together with the number of observations in the dataset used in the analyses below. The 24 brands in Table 1a account for the 80% of the total volume sales in the selected city-quarter pairs in the first event. The 34 brands in Table 1b account for the 83% of the respective total volume sales in the selected city-quarter pairs in the second event. Database A contains the total volume and the mean price (before taxes) per unit of volume (288 oz) for every brand, across city-quarter pairs. In dataset A, IRI aggregates information by adding the volume sold across all package sizes of a brand into one observation. To generate dataset B in a similar format as a dataset A (and thus make our analysis comparable across time), we aggregated IRI's weekly UPC-level data following the same procedure IRI used to generate the aggregate dataset A. Specifically, the average price per unit of volume was obtained by aggregating all revenue generated by a brand (regardless of its UPC) and dividing the resulting aggregate revenue by the aggregate volume sold for that brand.
11 Descriptive statistics for the brands and cities chosen for our study are provided for each dataset in Tables 2a  and 2b , respectively. These data include information contained in the IRI dataset, as well as data collected from specialized sources (i.e. demographics, temperatures). Based on the similarity of demographics, these data suggest that Albany appears to be the most reliable control in the first dataset as it is the most similar to Portland in terms of size (population), income and temperature. For the same reasons, Detroit is considered to be the most reliable control in the second dataset.
Figures A1 and A2 (shown in the appendix) display a comparison of the income distribution among treatment cities and the control cities. These figures confirm that Albany and Detroit are, respectively, the more logical control cities.
Results
Descriptive Evidence
A crucial requirement for the reliability of difference-in-difference estimators is that the control units should share a common trend with the treatment units. Since this condition is largely difficult to ensure in non-lab environments, it is important to check how plausible this assumption is. We do this by graphically comparing the evolution of the outcome variable of main interest (volume sales) in both the treatment city as well as in the control cities. Figures 1a  and 1b depict, for each data set, the quarterly series of total volume sales in every city. These volume sales are computed using the selected brands reported in Tables 1a and 1b. 12 The time We observe an unusually large peak in total volume sales for Portland in the third quarter in 1991. This peak only occurs in Portland and we are unsure about its cause. This peak may be a reason to doubt the appropriateness of the control cities as one would expect control cities to mimic volume changes in the treatment city. However, one would be particularly worried about this if such disparity between control and treatment cities is also observed in other quarters (especially those preceding the tax increase). The graph obtained by excluding that specific quarter (Figure 2a) suggests that the Portland volume sales peak appears to be an isolated event that occurred in the summer of 1991 13 since volume trends seem to be reasonably similar across cities once this quarter is removed from the graph. Due to this seemingly isolated disparity in trends, we exclude the third quarter in 1991 from our analysis. We note that, in any case, this choice will allow us to err on the conservative side when estimating the effect of the tax on consumption (i.e. including the spike in volume sales registered in the third quarter of 1991 in the regressions below leads to a positive effect of consumption by the tax increase, an unlikely scenario). In order to maintain consistency in the analysis of the two datasets, we also dropped the quarter when the tax was enacted from the analysis in our second event (figure 2b). (1990) (1991) (1992) 13 After checking that no transcription errors or other data mistakes were reported in our dataset, we checked whether this event was due to an unusually warm summer in Portland with respect to other cities. Figure 2a shows reasonably similar volume trends between the treatment city and the control cities in the period prior to the imposition of the soft drinks tax, adding confidence to our empirical approach. Moreover, and consistent with the demographic information, Albany's volume trend seems to more closely resemble that of Portland. Any significant changes in trends (between Portland and its controls) in the period after the tax increase can be used to infer what the effect of the tax on consumption might have been. Following the imposition of the tax, all cities show a negative trend in volume sales further, it appears as if Portland's downward trend (especially when compared with the most reliable control, Albany) might be somewhat more pronounced. While this "graphical" evidence suggests that the tax might have curbed soft drinks consumption in Maine, our overall initial assessment is that such effect might not be substantial. Similar comments can be made when interpreting the graph in Figure 2b . Clearly, the control city that better represents (pre-tax increase) volume sales trend in Cleveland (the treatment city), is Detroit. However, the other cities also show a similar trend, although a larger volume level can be observed in Philadelphia and Chicago with respect to Cleveland and Detroit. From the volume sales trend shown in the graph, Philadelphia appears to be the least appropriate control city for Cleveland. However, given the limited number of control cities, we decided to keep Philadelphia in the analysis and proceed with caution when considering results when using Philadelphia as a control city. As opposed to the first event, in this second event, the effect of the tax cannot be visualized on graphical inspection.
Regression Results
Tables 3a (dataset A) and 3b (dataset B) show the DIDM results for volume sales as well as for price. s opposed to the "total volume sales" variable in Figure 1 (which is the sum of volume sales over all brands in a city-quarter pair), "volume sales" in this analysis is measured at the brand level (as required by our econometric approach). Recall that we define the before period as the three quarters preceding the tax change 
Control city (#obs)
All control cities (96 Hartford (48) 0.01 (0.06) 0.00 (0.02) Notes: Pre-tax period is fourth quarter of 1990 through second quarter of 1991; post-tax period is fourth quarter of 1991 through second quarter of 1992. The specification uses the mean volume (and mean price) over the pre-tax and the post-tax periods, respectively (alternative specifications are shown in the appendix). The DIDM estimator is applied on the log of these mean values (see equation 1). Standard errors (in parenthesis) correspond to the nearest neighbor estimator provided by Abadie and Imbens (2008) .
Because the matching estimator requires one observation in each the post-and pretreatment periods, we aggregate quarters by taking the mean of the variable (volume or price) over the quarters considered (for both the before or the after period) and perform the test on the difference of the logs of these mean values (see equation 1). Results are not sensitive to this method of aggregation. Specifically, our conclusions remain unchanged if we report results on quarter by quarter comparisons.
14 For robustness purposes, we compute the DIDM estimator for all possible sets of control cities. That is, we consider the case in which we use all 3 control cities in the estimator, as well as cases when we include a pair of cities, or just one city. The parameter estimates can be (roughly) interpreted as the percentage variation of the variable of interest (in the treatment city) with respect to the control city (using the three quarters after the tax was enacted as the after period and the three quarters before the tax enactment as the before period). 
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Control city (#obs)
All control cities (120 Results in table 3a indicate that there is no statistically significant change in either price or volume for the first event. Similarly, the price estimates imply that firms in Portland did not react in any systematic way to the imposition of the tax; as a consequence, this evidence suggests that the tax was fully passed through to consumers.
While the lack of a significant effect on volume sales is confirmed in the second experiment (Table 3b) , we notice significant increases in the average price for Cleveland with respect to the control cities. In order to analyze in closer detail the observed price increases, we ran DIDM regressions quarter by quarter. For brevity, in the results below we report regressions where we consider all control cities and the most reliable control city in the group (for completeness we also report quarter by quarter results for the first event).
As shown in Table 4a , except for a 7% decrease with respect to Albany between the second quarter of 1991 and the same quarter of 1992, no other significant changes can be 15 Strictly speaking, because we are using the difference of the variable in natural log format, the percentage change in the variable is given by ̂ , where ̂ is the DIDM estimate reported in Tables 3a and 3b . For small enough ̂ (as is the case here) , ̂ is a good approximation of
highlighted for Portland before and after the tax was applied (recall that the tax was enacted during the third quarter of 1991). On the other hand, results shown in table 4b highlight that in the quarter following the tax increase, tax-exclusive prices did not experience a significant change (recall that the tax was applied at the beginning on the first quarter in 2003). However, this is not true for the following quarters. In fact, the greater the elapsed time between before and after tax periods, the higher are the price changes registered in Cleveland. In other words, the quarter by quarter comparisons suggest that the price increase that we observe in Cleveland is likely to be linked to Clevelandspecific events not related to the tax. Surprisingly, nevertheless, the registered price increases appear not to have affected soda consumption. Albany (48) HartfordBostonAlbany
Albany (48) Hartford - 
Graphical Brand-Level Analysis
To further understand whether there are particular patterns in price and volume changes at the brand level, we visually inspect price and volume changes for each brand in our dataset. Figures 3 and 4 show, respectively, the change in price and the change in volume for each brand-city pair (figures 3a and 4a correspond to dataset A and figures 3b and 4b correspond to dataset B). In the figures, brands appear on the horizontal axis, while cities are depicted by markers. These figures highlight the importance of using a control in measuring the desired effect. In addition, this graphical evidence is consistent with the econometric results. For the Portland event, there is no clear pattern suggesting a sizable effect of the tax increase in either volume or prices at the brand-level. In the Cleveland event, we notice from figure 3b a clear increase in price for virtually all brands in our sample, which is reflected in the econometric results. 
Conclusion
In this paper we show the results of DIDM and standard DID estimations, with the aim of uncovering the effect that the imposition of a soft drinks sales tax might have had on brand-level consumption and prices. Results suggest that the 5.5% sales tax that Maine applied to soft drinks in July of 1991 did not cause a generalized impact on volume sales at either the aggregate or the disaggregate (brand) level. Subsequently, using a more recent dataset (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) , we identified a similar tax event, which occurred in 2003, and we implemented a similar analysis. This allowed us to verify whether the effect of this type of tax has changed over time. This is particularly important given consumers' greater awareness about the correlation between obesity and soda consumption. As in 1991, we found that the 2003 application of a sales tax on soft drinks in Ohio did not affect the consumption in a significant way. In fact, we find that after the tax is applied, there is an overall increase in the tax-exclusive price in the treatment city that does not translate in a decrease in consumption either. Our results are robust to several alternative specifications.
While our main finding is consistent with the generalized conclusion in the literature that demand for soft drinks is inelastic, it casts some doubt about whether one should use price elasticities to form counterfactuals for how consumers might react to tax increases. Specifically, we find that such counterfactuals might be optimistic as they predict an actual reduction in consumption. The fact that the tax is not displayed on the shelf (where many consumers might base their purchasing decisions) may help explain why a tax does not cause a reduction in consumption in our data. One caveat of our study regarding Maine is that the tax was also applied to other high-calorie foods (snacks and pastries), so there is not much room for a possible substitution effect away from soda and towards other sources of sugar. This could partly explain the insignificant impact on soft drinks consumption in our quasi-experiment. However, this concern is not present in the second part of the study since the Ohio tax was soda specific. 16 Still, our results raise interesting questions about the role of substitute categories when a commodity is taxed. For example, if the impact on soft drink consumption in our study had been statistically significant and the tax had been applied only on soft drinks, a reduction in consumption could have reflected a switch towards higher consumption of other sugary products (and not necessarily the reduction in sugar intake intended by policy makers).
While we only look at two isolated instances of a tax increase, our results may have broader implications as the tax applied in Maine and Ohio are very close to the mean sales tax applied to soft drinks (currently enforced in 33 states), which is 5.2% . Also, because our data for price excludes the tax, we can directly test whether firms reacted in their pricing decisions. Our results suggest that the price increase due to the tax was entirely passed through to the consumer. This finding may be informative for future researchers in suggesting a likely pass-through rate for a tax increase when one needs to be assumed for counterfactual purposes.
Our results show the taxes in Maine and Ohio did not significantly decrease consumption. Therefore, these taxes have the effects of raising tax revenues for the states. While this added tax revenue should, in principle, be reinvested in programs and campaigns to promote a healthier consumption of food, in most of the cases the revenue from the "snack-taxes" has become part of the general treasury, as occurred in Maine (Jacobson and Brownell, 2000) . Sales taxes like the ones we study have been demonstrated to be regressive in previous studies (Wang, 2010; Lin and Smith, 2010; Chouinard et al., 2006) . In particular, it has been found that soda taxes generate a welfare loss not homogenously distributed across households of different income levels, with poorer consumers being more affected by such taxes (Wang, 2010) . The nature of our data does not allow us to separate the effects between different types of consumers; in this sense, we find that the "average" effect of the tax on consumption is null. To the extent that heterogeneous effects of taxation exist, there will be households that indeed reduce their consumption when a tax is applied while others might either be insensitive or even increase consumption. Specifically, there might be individuals that show strong soda consumption habits, probably due to a component of addiction caused by either caffeine or high glucose content, or their combined effect (West, 2001; Keast and Riddell, 2007) . Because the objective of the policy is to curb consumption for consumers who are less likely to give up consumption of soda, discussion of any proposal of special "soda taxes" should take into account the possibility that even substantial price increases from soda companies may have risible effects on volume sales. In sum, our study indicates that if the objective of the studied taxes was to influence behavior through a higher taxinclusive price for unhealthy foods (by inducing consumers to consume fewer high calorie drinks) the result of the tax imposition will be disappointing for policy makers. On the other hand, if the objective of the studied taxes was to raise states' revenues and use the additional resources to engage in other strategies to address the obesity problem, then soda taxes might have been quite successful.
Finally, we note one methodological point. While our matching mechanism is simple and intuitive, we are not aware of other studies that have applied this approach. We think that this could be a particularly useful technique in work that investigates the effect of a policy (or other environment changes) that is homogenously applied to a differentiated commodity. 
